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ELDRIDGE v. CITY OF PALO ALTO: ABERRATION
OR NEW DIRECTION IN LAND USE LAW?
The City of Palo Alto, with its population of 56,000, is situated
midway down the San Franicsco Peninsula between the metropolitan
areas of San Francisco and San Jose. Its reaches extend westward from
San Francisco Bay across the flat, developed lowlands, over grassy
rolling foothills, finally to the ridge of the scenic Santa Cruz Mountains.'
The setting is a relatively bucolic one, but, located at the fringe of two
expanding urban areas, strong pressures exist for development of the
remaining countryside.
In response to these pressures and to studies projecting the high
municipal costs involved in such development, the City of Palo Alto
passed on open-space zoning ordinance in 1972 which sharply reduced
building densities in the foothills area.2 Passage of this one piece of
legislation started what one commentator has since called the "prize
fight of the decade. '3  The number of landowners affected by this
open-space zoning was relatively small' but the extent of their dissatis-
faction was not. Over $20 million in lawsuits have been filed challeng-
ing the zoning,' thus making the courts the arena for this high stakes
prize fight.
While it has been said that the physical circumstances of Palo Alto
are unique,' the factors which have created its dilemma are ones
present in many American communities today. The heightened en-
vironmental awareness of the 1970's7 has gone hand in hand with the
increasing desire of many communities to limit their growth;8 counter-
I. See Thorwaldson, The Palo Alto Experience, 8 CRY CALIFORNIA 4 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Thorwaldson].
2. For a brief history of the Palo Alto open-space zoning see Eldridge v. City of
Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 621-24, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579-81 (1976).
3. Thorwaldson, supra note 1, at 5.
4. Id. at 9.
5. Id.
6. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 45 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as BOSSELMAN].
7. See id. at 210; Mercer, Regulation (Police Power) v. Taking (Eminent
Domain), 6 N.C. CENT. L.J. 177 (1974); Netherton, Implementation of Land Use
Policy: Police Power vs. Eminent Domain, 3 LAND & WATER L. REV. 33, 34 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Netherton].
8. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148 (1976); Bosselman, Property Rights in Land: New
Statutory Approaches, 15 NATURAL RES. J. 681, 681-83 (1975).
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vailing factors include a nationwide housing shortage and a growing
concern that private property rights are being subtly eroded. Because
of the universality of these problems and the growing tendency to seek
solutions through land use regulation, courts considering issues such as
those raised by Palo Alto landowners are closely watched from all sec-
tors.
Zoning in general has long been viewed as an acceptable tool for
implementing desired land use regulation under police power., The
power of eminent domain is another tool which gives governments
the power to affect private land ownership, but through direct acquisi-
tion rather than regulation. Although both powers similarly recognize
the superiority of community rights or public interest over individual
selfishness, 1 traditionally eminent domain and the police power have
been treated as disjunctive. In simple terms the two are distinguish-
able on the basis that "the former involves the taking of property be-
cause of the need of the property for the public use while the latter
involves the regulation of property to prevent the use thereof in a
manner that is detrimental to the public interest."
1 2
The Constitution requires that just compensation be paid to land-
owners whose property has been condemned or taken by a government
exercising its eminent domain power; 3 if property is taken and no com-
pensation awarded, the landowner is entitled to bring a so-called in-
verse condemnation action to compel payment. 4 In contrast, under
the police power constitutional requirements relate to the reasonableness
of the relation between the means used and the ends sought; a land-
owner affected by an unreasonable regulation is entitled to bring an
action challenging its validity.1"
9. BOSSELMAN, supra note 6, at 1-2; Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation and
Comprehensive Planning, 13 SANTA, CLARA LAW. 183, 234-35 (1972).
10. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Miller
v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925).
11. Sackman, The Impact of Zoning and Eminent Domain Upon Each Other,
INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 107, 108-09 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Sackman].
12. Sackman, supra note 11, at 107. See also Netherton, supra note 7, at 48.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19. For a complete
review of similar provisions which appear in the constitutions of other states, see Note,
Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordi-
nance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1439, 1439-40 n.3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Inverse Con-
demnation].
14. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.260 (West Supp. 1977).
15. See Netherton, supra note 7, at 36. Complicating matters somewhat is the
California doctrine of inverse condemnation which pertains to physical damage to land
caused by the government. This cause of action stems from the extra words added to the
California Constitution in 1879, words which do not appear in the fifth amendment of
the United States Constitution. Article 1, section 19, of the California Constitution
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This relatively straightforward state of legal affairs served well a
time when the detrimental uses prohibited under the police power were
more clearly akin to common law nuisances. 16 The times have
changed, however, and concepts of what is detrimental to the public
interest have grown apace with the population. The expansion of land
regulation under the police power has been accompanied by a similar
expansion of the public power to condemn land.17  The result is that
the spheres of these two powers have expanded to the point where they
are no longer so clearly separate. Courts, governments, and land-
owners alike are continually confused as to how far a governmental
entity may go, acting under its police powers, to preserve or affirma-
tively improve the quality of its environment.18  This confusion is
popularly denominated "the taking issue." 9 Despite the confusion,
however, precedent does still provide a basis for making some impor-
tant and fundamental distinctions between the police power and the
power of eminent domain. The California Court of Appeal decision
in Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto20 is an example of how precedent can
be misconstrued and how confusion can prevail; close analysis convinc-
ingly indicates that the decision should not stand. In a matter of such
importance it is time for the state's highest court to set the record
straight.
The Eldridge Decision
The Eldridge case actually involves two separate landowner
actions which were consolidated at the appellate level. Both plain-
tiffs-Eldridge and Beyer-alleged that the effect of the city's open-
space zoning was to arbitrarily and unreasonably take and damage their
reads: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation having first been made to, or paid into court for, the owner .... "
Originally, the additional words "or damaged" were thought to have the effect of
repealing traditional government immunity from tort actions for damage to land, so that
property owners suing the government had to make out the elements of a common law
action for damages. Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19, 119 P.2d 1 (1941).
Later, however, the California Supreme Court developed a special tort premised upon
absolute liability. Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42
Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965). Because these actions stem from the same constitutional lan-
guage, they too have come under the rubric of "inverse condemnation." The use of the
term for taking and tort actions has tended to cause confusion, and it is well to be wary
of how the term is used in California case law. See generally Van Alstyne, Inverse
Condemnation: Unintended Physical Damage, 20 HASTINGs L.J. 431 (1969).
16. See Netherton, supra note 7, at 36; Badler, Municipal Zoning Liability in
Damages.-A New Cause of Action, 5 URB. LAW. 25 (1973).
17. See Netherton, supra note 7, at 40-41.
18. See id. at 41.
19. See BOSSELMAN, supra note 6.
20. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
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properties for public use without compensation. 21  The only relief
sought by plaintiff Eldridge, who conceded that the ordinances were
valid, was damages in inverse condemnation; in contrast plaintiff Beyer
sought inverse condemnation damages or, in the alternative, a declara-
tion that the ordinances were unconstitutional, invalid, and void as ap-
plied to his property. 22  The trial court decision to dismiss the Eldridge
action was reversed by the court of appeal, with one judge dissenting
vigorously.23 A petition to the California Supreme Court resulted in
the case being retransferred to the appellate court for reconsideration in
light of the highest court's recent decision, 24 HFH, Ltd. v. Superior
Court.2 '  The two cases were consolidated and, after reconsideration,
the decision was the same;26 a second petition to the supreme court
was denied. This lengthy judicial process took over four years and was
all merely in preparation for the actual trial, which is finally about to
begin. This fact alone is testimony to the need for clarity in this area.
In substance the appellate decision establishes guidelines for the
trial of these as well as other land use cases. It falls into three major
parts. The first part considers the "preliminary question" of what the
appropriate remedy is for a landowner subjected to "excess regulation";
the choice is between requiring payment of compensation for the af-
fected property and invalidating the regulation.2 '  The answer is that
a zoning ordinance, while valid, may nonetheless "operate so oppres-
sively as to amount to a taking, thus giving an aggrieved landowner a
right to damages in inverse condemnation. 28  The court frames its
conclusion in a manner that permits a zoning ordinance to be both valid
and oppressive to a degree that requires compensation. Separating op-
pressiveness from validity in this way necessarily implies that the
oppressive application of an ordinance will not impair its validity and
will not be a part of the validity determination. It will be shown that
this conclusion-which speaks to a fundamental rather than to a mere
"preliminary" question-is a drastic, though perhaps unintentional, de-
parture from precedent, and one that is in no way supported by the
cited authorities. In fact, the cases cited by the court support the
established view, which is that oppressiveness is but one of several es-
21. Id. at 617, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
22. Id.
23. The original appellate decision in the Eldridge case, which appears at 124 Cal.
Rptr. 547 (1975), was omitted from the official reports because hearing was granted by
the California Supreme Court.
24. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 635-36, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 588-89.
25. 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975).
26. Compare 124 Cal. Rptr. 547, 558 (1975), with 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 634-35,
129 Cal. Rptr. 575, 588 (1976).
27. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 618, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
28. Id. at 621, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
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sential factors entering into any evaluation of an ordinance's validity.
If the measure is not held valid on this basis, it is struck down and no
compensation is awarded.
The second part of Eldridge attempts to define more clearly the
inverse condemnation cause of action deemed appropriate above.
"[T]he gist of plaintiffs' complaints is that the City's open-space
ordinances denied them any reasonable or beneficial use of their
land."2 9  In deference to HFH, the court acknowledges that constitu-
tional protections do not extend to landowners whose property has
merely been decreased in value as a result of a zoning action. 0 The
complaints of these plaintiffs are distinguished from HFH, however,
and it is concluded that, as a matter of law, they are sufficient to state
a cause of action for damages in inverse condemnation.3 Thus the
legal standard for entitlement to compensation is set absolutely at a de-
nial of all "reasonable or beneficial use"; this standard is to be applied
to the facts as they are developed at the subsequent trial. On the sur-
face the second part of this decision appears to flow logically from the
first, but underlying it are the same errors of interpretation which
earlier led the court astray. The cited cases are again concerned with
establishing the allowable limits of the police power, beyond which
regulations will be struck down as invalid; entitlement to compensation
is not in issue.
In the final segment of the opinion the court does specifically con-
sider the question of validity, thus. addressing plaintiff Beyer's challenge
on that basis. " The court poses the question in terms of whether or
not "the open-space and other public purposes of the City's zoning or-
dinances were constitutionally permissible objectives.""3  The analysis
of zoning ordinance validity hinges entirely upon purpose, 4 the court
holding that if the purpose of the ordinance is permissible the ordinance
is valid and beyond attack except in an action for damages in inverse
condemnation. 35 The court proceeds to uphold the validity of the Palo
29. Id. at 628, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 583. Generally, in 1959 Palo Alto annexed 6,000
acres of undeveloped foothills; this land was zoned for single family residential use on
one-acre minimum sites. Over a decade later the city began studying this land and
eventually amended its general plan and rezoned plaintiff's land "O-S" (Open Space).
The zoning adopted a ten-acre minimum lot size. A staff report prepared by the city
considered the effect of this ordinance on property owners and considered it to achieve a
reasonable balance between their interests and open-space objectives. Residential and
public recreation uses were among those permitted under the zoning.
30. Id. at 624, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
31. Id. at 629, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See text accompanying notes 215-16 infra.
35. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 631, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 586.
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Alto zoning and to dismiss this element of plaintiff Beyer's complaint. 6
The opinion here retains its internal consistency but is again predicated
upon the same underlying misconstruction of precedent.
It is possible that there were subtle influences not discernible on
the face of the opinion which pressured the Eldridge court toward its
given result. Prior to Eldridge two other cases involving the Palo Alto
open-space zoning reached the federal courts-Dahl v. City of Palo
Alto37 and Arastra Limited Partnership v. City of Palo Alto.3 8 In these
cases, plaintiff Dahl's inverse condemnation cause of action withstood
a motion to dismiss3" and the Arastra Partnership was actually adjudged
entitled to compensation on the merits.4 ° The fact that all three cases
involved the same ordinance may have caused the court of appeal to
feel a similar result was appropriate in Eldridge. The circumstances
of Dahl and Arastra, however, go far beyond the enactment of the zon-
ing which these cases share. The detailed history of close interaction
between those individual plaintiffs and the City of Palo Alto resounds
of bad faith, 41 whereas no such relationship is alluded to in Eldridge.
It will be shown below that a situation involving bad faith or "inequit-
able zoning actions undertaken by a public agency" comprises one of
two exceptions that have developed to the established rule that com-
pensation will not be awarded to remedy an overly oppressive zoning
measure. 2 As bad faith was not an element discussed by the Eldridge
court in reaching its conclusion to uphold the inverse condemnation
cause of action, the decision, as it stands, goes well beyond the holdings
of Dahl and Arastra. As such, the case is one that could have far-
reaching implications for land use decisions-both judicial and govern-
mental. Thus, it is one that deserves close attention and its errors
should not go unexposed.
Clarifying the Appropriate Remedy Issue:
Dissecting the Eldridge Decision
The court begins to answer the "preliminary question" as to the
appropriate remedy by quoting from the famous United States Supreme
Court decision, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon:4 3 "The general rule
36. Id.
37. 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
38. 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
39. In other words, in Dahl the plaintiff did not concede the ordinance's validity,
as did plaintiff Eldridge. In Dahl the plaintiff contended the zoning bears no reasonable
relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. 372 F. Supp. 647,
648 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
40. 401 F. Supp. 962, 978-79 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
41. See text accompanying notes 68-76 infra.
42. See text accompanying notes 179-98 infra,
43. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. ' 4   This lan-
guage is regarded as establishing the appropriate remedy15 and is inter-
preted literally to mean that if a regulation goes "too far" in terms of
its restrictions it thereby constitutes a taking of any private property af-
fected, for which compensation must be paid. On the basis of the en-
actment alone the property owner can compel payment through an
action in inverse condemnation if payment is not forthcoming volun-
tarily.
An examination of the quoted Pennsylvania Coal language in con-
text, however, reveals that the discussion is not concerned with the
appropriateness of various remedies in the event of oppressive regula-
tion. It is concerned with answering the threshold question whether
or not the act in question is a valid exercise of the police power;46 com-
pensation is not mentioned. The Supreme Court examines various as-
pects of the particular fact situation and concludes that the act "cannot
be sustained as an exercise of the police power . . . . 7 The act is
simply invalidated by the Court, and the landowner is not placed in the
position of being able to require compensation from the state, as the
Eldridge court holds he should be.
The confusion caused by Justice Holmes' famous words appears
to flow from his use of the word "taking," a word which in the consti-
tutional sense does mean more than mere invalidation. Attributing
such a meaning to this word in Pennsylvania Coal, however, is not com-
patible with the whole of that decision, where the "taking" phrase
follows and refers to the holding of invalidation. Were the Pennsyl-
vania Coal statute actually a taking and therefore an exercise of
eminent domain, a very different result would have accompanied the
decision in favor of the private litigant. 48  Placed in context, the "tak-
ing" language can have no other meaning than to indicate that certain
regulations are too restrictive to be accomplished through the police
power and that if the government subsequently desires to effectuate
such restrictions it must do so through an affirmative exercise of the
power of eminent domain. 9 The important point is that, unlike the
Eldridge court, the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal did not assume
44. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 618, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 577, quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
45. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 618, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 577-78.
46. 260 U.S. at 413.
47. Id. at 414.
48. See Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Anti-
dotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021,
1034-35 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Costonis].
49. See Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 639-41, 129 Cal. Rptr.
575, 591-92 (Sims, J., dissenting).
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the authority to transmute an invalid exercise of the police power into
an exercise of eminent domain, requiring compensation; that option
was left to the legislative arm of the government.50
Interestingly, the court of appeal in Eldridge makes reference to
this precise notion in its first opinion by quoting5' Nichols on Eminent
Domain:
Not only is an actual physical appropriation, under an
attempted exercise of the police power, in practical effect an
exercise of the power of eminent domain, but if regulative legisla-
tion is so unreasonable or arbitrary as virtually to deprive a person
of the complete use and enjoyment of his property, it comes within
the purview of the law of eminent domain. Such legislation is an
invalid exercise of the police power since it is clearly unreasonable
and arbitrary. It is invalid as an exercise of the power of eminent
domain since no provision is made for compensation.
5 2
The Eldridge court excludes the critical italicized sentences from its
second opinion53 and thereby undermines the rationale of this authority
in a fashion paralleling its misconstruction of Pennsylvania Coal. The
result is that the court of appeal instills the judiciary with the tradition-
ally legislative power of eminent domain where the United States
Supreme Court has refused to do so.
The court's use of the quotation54 from Goldblatt v. Hempstead,5"
which itself cites Pennsylvania Coal,5 is equally misplaced. In Gold-
blatt, the action was brought by a town to enjoin a landowner from
violating an ordinance prohibiting certain excavating. Defendants
countered that enforcement of the ordinance was a taking of their prop-
erty without due process of law. It was conceded that the ordinance
completely prohibited a beneficial use to which the property had been
previously devoted,57 but the ordinance was upheld as a valid exercise
of the police power.5 8 Compensation to the landowner was not in
issue. In light of these facts, it is difficult to understand how this case
can support the Eldridge proposition that a landowner's proper remedy
is in inverse condemnation.
50. See Inverse Condemnation, supra note 13, at 1446.
51. 124 Cal. Rptr. at 554-55.
52. 1 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.42[1], at 116-21 (3d rev.
ed. 1976) (emphasis added). See also Sackman, supra note 11, at 109.
53. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 627, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
54. It should be noted that this quotation is dictum rather than the holding, as
suggested by the Eldridge court. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 618, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
55. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
56. Id. at 594.
57. Id. at 592.
58. Id. at 596. In fact, the court does not even view this case as one concerned
with a zoning ordinance; it is a safety ordinance that is under consideration. Id. at 597.
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The Eldridge court also looks to three lower federal court deci-
sions, which it maintains have all "held that an action in inverse con-
demnation will lie when a valid zoning ordinance is 'exceptionally re-
strictive,' or 'arbitrary and capricious,' or 'allows no reasonable use of
plaintiff's property.'-59 At first glance one of these cases, Brown v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,"' does appear to support the
proposition that a valid regulation may constitute a compensable tak-
ing."' In Brown, as a result of certain land use restrictions, plaintiff
sought alternative relief 2 similar to that sought by plaintiff Beyer. 3
The court, based on the pleadings, found that the complaint did state
a claim for declaratory and compensatory relief; 4 declaratory relief
would be proper if all the facts of the case proved the land use classi-
fications to be so arbitrary and prohibitive as to be invalid.6 5 If, how-
ever, the demands of public welfare were found to require such restric-
tions, they would be declared validly enacted under the police power
but might nonetheless be so destructive of property values as to necessi-
tate compensating affected landowners.8 6 If this had been the last
word of the Brown case on this subject, Eldridge could properly derive
considerable support from it; however, in a subsequent order the Brown
court "reached the conclusion that the relief available is limited to de-
claratory and injunctive remedies,"'67 thereby precluding an award of
compensation and negating any support for the Eldridge proposition.
Two other federal decisions cited by the court of appeal are the
previously mentioned Arastra68 and Dahl69 cases. Again, although
these cases involved the same ordinances complained of in the Eldridge
case,70 the allegations and facts of Arastra and Dahl are readily distin-
guishable. The Arastra holding rested on much more than just the
open-space ordinances common to these three cases. 71  In light of the
59. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 620, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
60. 385 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Nev. 1973).
61. Id. at 1132. The language quoted by the Eldridge court is as follows: "[P]ub-
lie welfare and necessity may reasonably require exceptionally restrictive land use classi-
fication . . . but . . . such valid regulations may nevertheless constitute a taking of
private property for public use entitling the owner to just compensation." 57 Cal. App.
3d at 620, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
62. 385 F. Supp. at 1130.
63. See text accompnaying note 22 supra.
64. 385 F. Supp. at 1132.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Order Denying Motion for Rehearing, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, Civil
No. R-2773 BRT (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist.) Jan. 10, 1975.
68. 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
69. 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974)
70. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 620, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
71. In Arastra, the court makes repeated references to Palo Alto's express intent to
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ordinances' history and the long relationship between the particular
landowner plaintiff and the defendant city, it was concluded that the
ordinance
was not a bona fide attempt to impose limitations on the use of
the property of the plaintiff, but rather the final step in a program
designed to acquire rights over the property for the enjoyment and
use of the public in general.
72
Palo Alto had expressed a specific intent to acquire the property of this
plaintiff, and the court found it had never abandoned its purpose to
do so. 73  Similarly the plaintiff in Dahl alleged that, in addition to the
restrictive zoning, Palo Alto had earlier taken certain actions with the
specific intent of reducing the market value of her property should it
eventually be condemned.7 4  Allegations involving inequitable govern-
mental action were not made in Eldridge. It will subsequently be
shown that such allegations are critical in making out an exceptional
case that does not fall under the general rule calling for invalidation
of oppressive measures.7" Dahl and Arastra are thus not relevant to
the question of the appropriate remedy when that question is raised
acquire the property in question. See, e.g., 401 F. Supp. at 979. The court said, "The
basic question of law, then, is this: If a city with power to do so decides, to acquire
property to preserve scenic beauty, open space and the view for a public park and city
roads, takes substantially all steps toward doing so, short of payment, leads the public
and property owners to believe that the acquisition is inevitable, delays all development
of the property [here for six years] while preparing for acquisition, and then, when it
has determined that the cost is higher than hoped, on the pretense of protecting against
nonexistent hazards found to exist without substantial evidence, enacts an ordinance,
accomplishing all of the purposes of the acquisition, which purports to allow uses of
property which are not economically realistic, with no inquiry as to the economic
feasibility of the purported uses, is the resulting loss of value to the property affected
compensable? The answer must be 'yes'." Id. at 981.
72. Id. at 978-79.
73. Id. at 982.
74. 372 F. Supp. at 648. Allegations of breach of contract and misrepresentations
were also made. Id. It is possible to distinguish the Dahl case on a second basis. In
that case the court upheld, on the basis of the pleadings, a complaint seeking declaratory
relief or inverse condemnation compensation in the alternative. See note 39 supra. The
precise question as to which of these two alternatives was the proper remedy was not
decided. The court did point out, however, that the question whether the city's zoning
was a valid exercise of the police power was a factual one of reasonableness, to be based
on considerations "encompassing the interests of the public, the appropriateness of the
means, and the oppressiveness of the action." 372 F. Supp. at 648. This statement
suggests that the Dahl court would invalidate an unduly oppressive ordinance; this
analysis is in conflict with the Eldridge conclusion to hinge validity solely on purpose,
while considering oppressiveness only in the context of determining whether compensa-
tion is appropriate.
75. See text accompanying notes 179-98, supra.
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outside of a situation involving wrongful governmental action of this
nature.76
With respect to pertinent California law, the often-cited supreme
court cases of Klopping v. City of Whittier77 and HFH are also used
for support. The Eldridge court refers to the "de facto taking" discus-
sion in Klopping as apposite. 78 That discussion proceeds as follows:
In de facto taking cases, the landowner claims that because
of particularly oppressive acts by the public authority the "taking"
actually has occurred earlier than the date set by statute (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1249). . . The prevailing rule, as stated recently
by the New York Court of Appeals . . . is that before a de facto
taking results there must be a "physical invasion or direct legal re-
straint." . . . One example of a "legal restraint" discussed in
several California cases has been a particularly harsh zoning regula-
tion, often calculatingly designed to decrease any future condemna-
tion award.
79
This is interpreted in Eldridge to "mean that a valid, but particu-
larly harsh, zoning regulation may give rise to damages in inverse con-
demnation, for if the regulation were invalid it could have no effect
giving rise to such damages." ' Once again, a closer look at the cited
authority reveals that the court's interpretation is incorrect.
First, it should be noted that the Kopping discussion of de facto
takings is no more than dictum. 81 The California Supreme Court itself
pointed out that the issues involved in a de facto taking situation are
"significantly distinct"8 2 from those which arose in the situation under
immediate consideration there. 3  More important, the above quoted
definition of a de facto taking makes it one of questionable application
to the Eldridge facts in any event. The reference to Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 1249,4 which sets the valuatibn date in eminent domain
proceedings, indicates that the de facto situation occurs only when the
governmental authority has initiated eminent domain proceedings
76. As a final note in this regard, the Eldridge majority's use of the Arastra
decision is further undercut by the subsequent issuance of an order to expunge the
decision; this order would appear to have the effect of minimizing the citation value of
the Arastra decision. Cf. CAL. R. Cr. (Miscellaneous) 977.
77. 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972).
78. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 618, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
79. 8 Cal. 3d at 46, 500 P.2d at 1351, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 7 (emphasis added).
80. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 618, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
81. 8 Cal. 3d at 46, 500 P.2d at 1351, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
82. Id. at 47, 500 P.2d at 1351, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
83. Id. The issue before the court in Klopping was deemed to be one of valuation,
whereas in the de facto cases the question is determining at what date the taking actually
occurred. For a subsequent pronouncement by the supreme court on the limited scope of
the Klopping holding see HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Ct., 15 Cal. 3d 508, 517, 542 P.2d 237,
243, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 371, n.14 (1975).
84. CAL. QV. PROC. CODE § 1249 (West 1972) (repealed 1975).
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against the landowner, 85 the landowner thereafter contending that the
taking occurred at a date earlier than that set by the statute.8" The
noteworthy feature of this situation is that the governmental authority
initiates the action (seemingly making the action in inverse condemna-
tion superfluous) and thereby implicitly expresses its desire to acquire
the land. This is quite different from the Eldridge situation, where
Palo Alto did not bring the action and clearly has expressed no desire
to acquire the land. To draw from the Kopping dictum support for
the notion that a landowner, on the basis of zoning alone, is entitled
to bring an action forcing a city to provide compensation is to draw
water from a dry well.
The Applicability of the HFH Decision
The court's reliance on HFH is equally strained;8 7 it misconstrues
both the legal analysis of that case and its application to the facts at
hand. The "narrow" issue considered in HFH was "whether a com-
plaint alleging that a zoning action taken by a city council reduced the
market value of petitioners' . . . land state[s] a cause of action in in-
verse condemnation. ' 88  It held it does not, for a decline in market
value does not "damage" property within the meaning of the California
Constitution. 8  The clearest and most correct view is to regard the
facts in Eldridge as falling within the HFH rule. Under this view, the
85. It is noteworthy that a separate section exists to cover situations involving
inverse condemnation actions. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1245.260 (West Supp. 1977).
86. Although this is the apparent meaning of the court's language, it is noteworthy
that some lack of clarity may remain as to the precise definition of a de facto taking.
This is pointed out by the divergent cases cited in support of its discussion. See, e.g.,
Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969);
Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963); Kissinger
v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958). The supreme court
itself described the Peacock case as one involving a five year course of inequitable and
extraordinary conduct by a public agency; the landowners did bring the action and
recovered damages in inverse condemnation. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Ct., 15 Cal. 3d 508,
517, 542 P.2d 237, 243, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 371 (1975). In Sneed, the landowner
succeeded with his cause of action in inverse condemnation and received compensation
for the taking of an air easement which had actually been used by the public for over
five years. In Kissinger, also an airport case, the zoning ordinance was considered to be
spot zoning and was declared invalid; no damages were awarded despite some conduct
similar to that in Peacock. Compare Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App.
2d 845, 852-55, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391, 397-99 (1969), with Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles,
161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 461-62, 327 P.2d 10, 18 (1958). Even if each of these cases is
somehow representative of the de facto taking situation, they are nonetheless quite
different from the Eldridge case. See text accompanying notes 120-32 infra.
87. Unfortunately the dissent's analysis is also not particularly helpful here. See
57 Cal. App. 3d at 636, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
88. 15 Cal. 3d at 511, 542 P.2d at 239, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
89. See note 12 supra.
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dismissals of the inverse condemnation actions should have been sus-
tained.
Although the Eldridge decision does leave many factual issues
unanswered,90 sufficient facts were presented upon which to base a de-
cision to dismiss plaintiff Beyer's action. The court took judicial notice
of the facts that, subsequent to his appeal, Beyer conveyed title to the
property in question to another in exchange for $70,000,91 and that this
subsequent purchaser then "subdivided and built upon the property in
accordance with the ordinances here under consideration. 92  Techni-
cally, the pleadings of the HFH plaintiffs and plaintiff Beyer are dif-
ferent; Beyer alleges that the effect of the open-space zoning has been
to deprive him of all reasonable and beneficial use of the property,
whereas in HFH it was alleged only that the property was useless for
one but not all purposes consonant with the zoning.93 In light of the
sale of Beyer's land as judicially noticed by the Eldridge court, how-
ever, a critical distinction between the two cases should not be made
on the basis of this technicality of pleading. The plaintiffs in HFH,
in a manner quite similar to Beyer, "allege[d] a remaining fair market
value of $75,000."9 The supreme court's view of this admission was
that "[t]he substantial value of their land rebuts the allegation that they
cannot enjoy any reasonably beneficial use of it."9  The remaining
substantial value of Beyer's land, of which the court took judicial notice,
should similarly rebut such an allegation.96
90. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 628, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
91. See Respondent's Petition for Hearing, at 3-4 & n.6, Eldridge v. City of Palo
Alto, Civil Nos. 33517, 34134 (Cal. Sup. Ct., filed June 1, 1976). The dissent argues
that because the buyer sold his land he no longer has a pecuniary or other interest in a
declaration as to the ordinance's validity. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 654, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
92. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 634, 654, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 587, 601. This acknowledge-
ment is curious in light of the court's placing "particular significance" on what it
considers the unanswered factual question of whether plaintiffs' land is salable. Id. at
628, 129 Rptr. at 584.
93. 15 Cal. 3d at 512, 542 P.2d at 240, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
94. Id. at 512 n.2, 542 P.2d at 240, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
95. Id. A similar argument was made to rebut the allegation that land was
valueless in Hamer v. Town of Ross, 59 Cal. 2d 776, 787-88, 382 P.2d 375, 382-83, 31
Cal. Rptr. 335, 342-43 (1963).
96. The Eldridge court attempts to liken the situation of plaintiff Beyer to that of
plaintiff Sarff in Klopping. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 534. The city in the Kopping case
several times announced its firm intention to condemn both plaintiffs' properties and
ultimately did acquire their lands. Sarff's land was purchased by the City of Whittier
from a successor to whom Sarff had lost the land through foreclosure proceedings. The
city tried to contend that since the plaintiff did not own the property at the time of
condemnation, he was barred from any recovery whatsoever. The supreme court noted
the special statutory provisions governing the award of damages when a public entity
fails to initiate a condemnation suit within six months of announcing its intention to do
so. 8 Cal. 3d at 57-58, 500 P.2d at 1349-50, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 15-16, citing CAL. Crv.
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In contrast to Beyer's situation, the particular facts pleaded by and
noticed with respect to plaintiff Eldridge97 do not fall quite as neatly
within the rule of HFH. Eldridge's complaint does, however, fall
neatly within an important caveat set out by the supreme court, and
it is at this point that substantial confusion begins. The caveat to HFH
is worded as follows:
This case does not present, and we therefore do not decide,
the question of entitlement to compensation in the event a zoning
regulation forbade substantially all use of the land in question. We
leave the question for another day.98
It is apparently assumed by the court of appeal that Eldridge's action
for damages is tailor-made to fall within the HFH caveat.99 The error
in this assumption corresponds with the court's error in interpreting the
"taking" language of Pennsylvania Coal.100 The proper question to be
addressed as a result of this caveat is whether a zoning ordinance that
forbids "substantially all use of the land"'' is per se invalid due to the
extensiveness of its restrictions; an affirmative answer would require
invalidation of the ordinance rather than compensation of the land-
owner. It is argued that the phrase "entitlement to compensation" is
to be construed as was the "taking" language in Pennsylvania Coal,1
0 2
not literally but rather as an expression attempting to define the outer
limits of the police power beyond which measures will become invalid.
The propriety of the more figurative interpretation is revealed in the
body of that opinion.
Consistent with this analysis, the HFH court recognized "manda-
mus as the proper remedy for allegedly arbitrary or discriminatory zon-
ing" and acknowledged that in appropriate cases it has struck down land
use restrictions which suffer from procedural or substantive deficien-
cies."' One such appropriate case cited was Hamer v. Town of
PROC. CODE § 1243.1. The Kopping court held that if plaintiff Sarff was ultimately to
recover, the proper measure of damages was loss of rental income under the special
statute. Plaintiff Beyer's situation could not be more different. The City of Palo Alto
has neither announced its intention to condemn his property nor initiated any such
action, and thus Beyer is not eligible for any statutory damages for loss of rental income.
97. See Respondent's Petition for Hearing in the Supreme Court of the State of
California at 14-15, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, Civil Nos. 33517, 34134 (Cal. Sup.
Ct., filed June 1, 1976).
98. 15 Cal. 3d at 518 n.16, 542 P.2d at 244, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
99. Beyer's action is also within the HFH caveat in light of the court's subsequent
declaration of the challenged ordinance's validity.
100. For a discussion of the Eldridge court's interpretation of the Pennsylvania
Coal case, see text accompanying notes 43-50 supra.
101. 15 Cal. 3d at 518 n.16, 542 P.2d at 244, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
102. 260 U.S. at 415.
103. 15 Cal. 3d at 513-14, 542 P.2d at 241, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 369. The HFH court
does acknowledge that inverse condemnation will be upheld in an appropriate situation,
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Ross,10 4 a case in which the supreme court held a zoning restriction on
minimum lot size invalid because it was oppressive and unreason-
able. 05 No damages were discussed or awarded. On the basis of the
pleadings it is difficult to discern any distinguishing features of Eldridge
that would make an inverse condemnation action appropriate there
whereas it was not in Hamer.
HFH offers further guidance on the subject of the appropriate
remedy.'0 6 The supreme court considers and rejects plaintiff's alter-
nate claim for interim damages in the event the challenged zoning is
invalidated. In the course of this consideration the supreme court
states, "both constitutional and institutional understandings require that
legislative acts, even if improper, find their judicial remedy in the un-
doing of the wrongful legislation, not in money damages awarded
against the state."' 0 7  The result of awarding damages in inverse
condemnation, as mandated by the court of appeal in Eldridge, is
not in accord with this statement. In the same regard the California
Tort Claims Act'08 is quoted in HFH as stating "that '(a) public entity
is not liable for an injury caused by adopting or failing to adopt an en-
actment . . ."'109 A zoning ordinance is such an enactment. The
HFH plaintiffs' argument that the damage claim sounds in inverse con-
demnation rather than tort does not succeed, for it fails to "recognize
that inverse condemnation lies only for a taking or damaging, while im-
proper zoning actions may generally be attacked only by mandate." 10
These statements weigh heavily against the propriety of the inverse
condemnation action. The scales are tipped further by the fact that
and advocates of the Eldridge approach might find comfort in such a statement. It is
stated that California courts "have recognized the constitutional values served by actions
in inverse condemnation and have not hesitated to validate complaints appropriately
employing this theory of recovery." 15 Cal. 3d at 513, 542 P.2d at 240-41, 125 Cal.
Rptr. at 368-69. HFH, however, cites three physical damage cases in support of this
statement: Holtz v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 296, 475 P.2d 441, 90 Cal. Rptr. 345
(1970); Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr.
89 (1965); Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162
(1974). This suggests that inverse condemnation actions are appropriate in the event of
physical damage rather than in the factual situation presented by a case such as Eldridge.
104. 59 Cal. 2d 776, 382 P.2d 375, 31 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1963).
105. Id. at 783, 382 P.2d at 376, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
106. 15 Cal. 3d at 518-19, 542 P.2d at 244-45, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372-73.
107. Id. at 519, 542 P.2d at 245, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 373. The court states that
zoning clearly is included here. Id.
108. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 818.2 (West 1966).
109. 15 Cal. 3d at 519, 542 P.2d at 245, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
110. Id. at 519-20, 542 P.2d at 245, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 373. The use of the word
"generally" in the quotation arguably was intended to leave room for the two types of
exceptional cases presented in this note (see text accompanying notes 52-56 supra) and
those suggested in HFH itself. See 15 Cal. 3d at 517 n.14, 542 P.2d at 243, 125 Cal.
Rptr. at 371,
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Eldridge is unique among the cases in its consideration of oppressive-
ness as a measure of entitlement to compensation rather than as a fac-
tor determining validity.
Finally, the court of appeal cites the following HFH footnote for
support: "If such a reduction in market value constituted an injury, it
would occur regardless of the legality of the zoning action occasioning
it. . . ."I" The court has evidently interpreted this language as a re-
statement of its own conclusion that the application of an ordinance
which is valid may simultaneously entitle a landowner to compensation
in inverse condemnation (i.e., constitute an injury).112 However, the
HFH footnote is a reference to the fact that after a governmental entity
has caused irrevocable physical damage to property, questions as to the
propriety of such actions are no longer relevant. The mandamus
remedy is no longer effective; with down zoning, mandamus will always
be appropriate. Given that down zoning is the harm of which plaintiff
Eldridge complains, repeal of the challenged zoning would restore him
to his former position. Thus the reasons which caused the propriety
of the action to be irrelevant in the case of irrevocable damage are not
applicable in an Eldridge type situation. In addition, the court of ap-
peal has apparently overlooked the pertinent portion of the HFH foot-
note, which points out that the proper action in the event of improper
zoning is administrative mandamus."'
Other Authority from the California Courts
In its reliance on other California court of appeal decisions, the
Eldridge court overlooks important factual distinctions in an area of the
law where such distinctions are determinative."' Considering the con-
fusion surrounding the term "taking," it becomes necessary to look at
the cases themselves in some depth rather than merely at aphoristic
excerpts.
Three of the cases cited in Eldridge involve circumstances sur-
rounding the operation of airports and each is readily distinguishable
111. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 619, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 578, citing HFH, Ltd. v. Superior
Ct., 15 Cal. 3d 508, 516 n.13, 542 P.2d 237, 242-43, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 371 (1975)
(emphasis added by Eldridge court).
112. The Eldridge court mistakenly refers to this footnoted material as the holding
of the case. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 619, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
113. 15 Cal. 3d at 516 n.13, 542 P.2d at 242-43, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 371. The effect
of Eldridge's interpretation of the HFH caveat again comes to the fore. By mistakenly
interpreting that caveat as a statement which leaves open the question whether a
landowner is entitled to actual damages in the undecided situation, rather than invalida-
tion, the court of appeal lays the foundation for its consistent but equally mistaken
interpretation of the HFH footnote.
114. See, e.g., Pennsylavnia Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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from the instant case. In Aaron v. City of Los Angeles,11 5 a case which
was not concerned with zoning, the landowner plaintiff did succeed
with his cause of action in inverse condemnation and was held entitled
to compensation for the taking of an air easement. 11 6 The holding,
however, was expressly limited to a situation where a landowner shows
a measureable reduction in market value resulting from the opera-
tion of the airport in such manner that the noise from aircraft
using the airport causes a substantial interference with the use and
enjoyment of the property, and the interference is sufficiently direct
and sufficiently peculiar that the owner, if uncompensated, would
pay more than his proper share to the public undertaking.
11
In a situation where the harm is caused by an airport already in full
operation, it is difficult to imagine a realistic yet effective remedy for
a landowner other than compensation; such an irrevocable situation is
markedly different from that in Eldridge, where the alleged harm is
caused by an ordinance which could simply be invalidated." 8
The court in Aaron did refer to "[s]everal California cases
[which have] found that zoning restrictions intended to facilitate the
operation of an airport and to protect the approaches to it may consti-
tute a taking of the property.""19  Two of them are also cited by the
Eldridge court. As will be shown below, those cases provide as little
support for the Eldridge analysis as does the Aaron opinion.
Sneed v. County of Riverside 20 is the first of the cases cited by
both the Aaron court and the Eldridge court.' 2' As with the aforemen-
tioned case, the fact that the inverse condemnation action there was
upheld should not be translated into support for the Eldridge proposi-
tion that valid yet oppressive zoning requires compensation. The pur-
ported zoning in Sneed was designed to protect airport approaches.'
22
It contemplated what became an actuality-the public use of the zoned
115. 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1974).
116. Id. at 493, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. The Aaron court deliberately refused to specify whether the airport had
"taken" or "damaged" the land of the plaintiffs. It affirmed a lower court judgment
granting an easement in the air space over and near the plaintiffs' property. Id. at 475-
76, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 164-65. On the other hand, cases in other states requiring phys-
ical invasion of air space were distinguished on the basis of the "or damaged" clause
of the California Constitution. Id. at 479, 486, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 167, 172.
119. Id. at 481, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
120. 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963).
121. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 620, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
122. 218 Cal. App. 2d at 208-09, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 320. The restrictions in this case
involved use of the airspace above plaintiff's land. In some instances this use was limited
to a height of three inches. The court held that plaintiff had set forth two bases upon
which he would be entitled to compensation-the obtaining of an air easement and the
actual use of the airspace. Id.
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airspace to operate flights on a continuous basis. The irrevocable
nature of this situation again distinguishes it from Eldridge.
More important, the Sneed zoning was not held to be a valid exer-
cise of the police power, as suggested by Eldridge.2' It was, on the
contrary, found distinct from traditional police power measures in that
it went beyond destruction of property rights and actually conferred
them on the public for its use. ' 2  The county's characterization of the
measure as one authorized under the police power was not found to
be conclusive, for in reality the measure was an exercise of the power
of eminent domain. 2 ' Here the taking was literal rather than figura-
tive in that the property was in fact converted to public use; it is implicit
that the county desired and intended to use this property. It should
be stressed that this judicial recharacterization of an ordinance as an
exercise of eminent domain is not comparable to the Eldridge decision,
which purports to give courts the ability to recharacterize where the
governmental entity has in no sense actually used the plaintiff's prop-
erty or expressed a desire to acquire it.
The second case is Peacock v. County of Sacramento,126 which is
relied on directly in Eldridge."7  It also sustained a judgment for the
landowner in inverse condemnation, 28 but again it did so under cir-
cumstances significantly different from those alleged to have taken
place in Palo Alto. In Peacock, the defendant county's conduct con-
tinued over the course of some ten years during which time it discrim-
inatorily applied to plaintiff's property an ordinance that precluded all
vegetation and structures therefrom, publicly stated its intention to pur-
chase that property, and rejected plaintiff's subdivision map. 29 No-
tably, the court found that it was the totality of these circumstances
rather than any one action or enactment that constituted inverse con-
demnation." 0 The case presented by plaintiffs Eldridge and Beyer
involves no such totality of circumstances; therefore the holding of Pea-
cock is not applicable to it.
On at least two occasions the California Supreme Court itself has
referred to the import of the "exceptional and extraordinary" circum-
stances of Peacock."' Following a description of these circumstances,
123. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 620, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
124. 218 Cal. App. 2d at 209, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
125. Id.
126. 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969).
127. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 620, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
128. 271 Cal. App. 2d at 866, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
129. See id. at 846-55, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 393-99.
130. Id. at 856, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
131. See HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Ct., 15 Cal. 3d 508, 517 n.14, 542 P.2d 237, 243,
125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 371 (1975); Selby Realty Co. v. City of Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d
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the HFH decision concludes, "Again one sees that the down-zoning
rises to a taking only in connection with inequitable precondemnation
actions by the public agency."' 2 These circumstances, it will be shown,
create an exception to, rather than an example of, the general rule,
which is that enactment of overly restrictive zoning does not entitle an
affected landowner to compensation in an inverse condemnation action.
Three remaining appellate decisions were cited by Eldridge but
are equally unconvincing. In Gisler v. County of Madera'13 the court
upheld, as a valid exercise of the police power, an ordinance which
zoned plaintiff's property exclusively for agricultural uses and pro-
hibited sale of parcels under eighteen acres; 3 4 no compensation was
awarded. The quotation cited by the Eldridge court to affirm its
position on inverse condemnation'3 5 is subjected to the same misinter-
pretation as was the language in Pennsylvania Coal, while more
relevant material is overlooked: "Zoning ordinances which . .. are
unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their application to particu-
lar properties will be held not applicable on constitutional grounds.'
13 6
The plaintiffs in Eldridge make just such allegations of unreasonable-
ness with respect to the open-space ordinances, and this statement pro-
vides a straightforward answer to the question regarding their appropri-
ate remedy. The correct remedy is invalidation rather than judicially
mandated transformation of the zoning measure into an exercise of
eminent domain.
Another appellate decision cited in Eldridge, People ex rel.
Department of Public Works v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.,
3 7
involved an eminent domain proceeding brought by the state of Cali-
fornia; the landowner did not succeed in this action with a collateral
attack upon a city zoning ordinance.13 8  It was held that an attack
aimed at having the condemned property valued free of city zoning re-
110, 120, 514 P.2d 111, 117, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 805 (1973). See also Eldridge v. City
of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 643-45, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575, 594-95 (1976).
132. 15 Cal. 3d at 517 n.14, 542 P.2d at 243, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 371 (emphasis
added).
133. 38 Cal. App. 3d 303, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974).
134. Id. at 307, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 920-21. This is to be compared with the lesser
ten acre restriction in Palo Alto.
135. See 57 Cal. App. 3d at 619, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 578. "' In certain factual
situations it is difficult to draw a precise line between a noncompensable injury resulting
from the enactnfent of a valid [zoning] regulation under the police power ... and
[such] regulations which are beyond the limits of the police power and can only be
justified as a "taking" under the power of eminent domain which requires just
compensation.'" Id., quoting Gisler v. County of Madera, 38 Cal. App. 3d 303, 306,
112 Cal. Rptr. 919, 920 (1974) (citations omitted).
136. 38 Cal. App. 3d 303, 306, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919, 920 (1974).
137. 33 Cal. App. 3d 960, 109 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1973).
138. Id. at 965-66, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 528-29.
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strictions designed to depress its value would have been appropriate
had the city rather than the state been the authority bringing the
eminent domain action.' Clearly this holding has little relevance to
Eldridge, where no eminent domain proceedings whatsoever have been
initiated. The language from Southern Pacific quoted in Eldridge
140
indicates approval of bringing an action in inverse condemnation in the
event a zoning ordinance is designed to depress property values with
a view to future eminent domain proceedings. The absence of allega-
tions of any such design demonstrates that this language does not per-
tain to the facts of Eldridge. This becomes even more apparent when
it is pointed out that the two authorities cited in Southern Pacific for
its statement are the previously distinguished Peacock and Sneed
cases.14 1  Eldridge's inclusion of the Southern Pacific court's state-
ment that "''[t]he zoning restriction may be invalidated by a direct at-
tack' "142 only further militates against the Eldridge conclusion that
compensation is an appropriate remedy for harsh or oppressive zoning.
The plaintiffs in Turner v. County of Del Norte,143 another
appellate decision considered in Eldridge, did not succeed with their
inverse condemnation action. In fact, the court upheld as a proper ex-
ercise of the police power a flood plain ordinance restricting land-
owners to fewer uses than were permitted under the Palo Alto open-
space zoning. 14 4  Nonetheless, the Eldridge court cites this case for
support and quotes from it the following language: "Despite the con-
clusion that the zoning ordinance is valid as a reasonable exercise of
the police power, the appellants would still be entitled to compensation
if there was a taking of their property.' 145  This language must be
viewed in the proper context. The flood plain zoning in this case was
enacted as part of a flood control project. The plaintiff contended that
the county had taken a flowage easement in that this project would
cause increased inundation of his property in future floods. 46 The evi-
dence did not support this contention, but the court's statement indi-
cates that had the allegation proved true, the compensable taking would
have occurred regardless of the zoning. The situation suggested is
analogous to that described in Sneed. In the case of irreversible physi-
cal damage or actual public use, the matter of the validity of the zon-
139. Id.
140. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 619, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
141. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 965-66, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
142. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 619, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
143. 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972).
144. !d. at 314, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 95-96.
145. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 620, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 578-79, quoting Turner v. County of
Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 315, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93, 96 (1972).
146. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 315, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
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ing almost becomes moot, 147 and courts will look through zoning classi-
fications invoked merely to evade the constitutional requirement that
property be acquired in eminent domain proceedings providing com-
pensation. The Eldridge case is not a case which includes either of
these factors, and inverse condemnation is therefore not proper.
As it has misinterpreted the case law, so has the court of appeal
misinterpreted statutory law. The court states that "California's Legis-
lature has also recognized that an unreasonably drastic open-space zon-
ing ordinance, although otherwise valid, may result in taking requiring
'just compensation therefor.' "14 This analysis is based on Govern-
ment Code section 65912.1" This section, however, does no more
than reiterate basic constitutional guarantees with respect to the taking
of private property for public use.'5 0 The section itself declares that
it is not intended to alter those constitutional rights,'' and it has been
shown that, according to California case law, the established definition
of the scope of property rights does not entitle landowners to compen-
sation predicated on the enactment of a zoning ordinance alone. As
the Eldridge interpretation cannot be distilled out of those cases, it
similarly cannot properly be derived from this statute.
A recent post-Eldridge California Court of Appeal decision,
Pinheiro v. County of Marin,52 sharply illuminates the growing confu-
sion in this area.'!, The facts of Pinheiro and Eldridge are quite
147. See also HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Ct., 15 Cal. 3d 508, 516 n.4, 542 P.2d 237,
242-43, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 371 (1975).
148. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 619, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
149. The section provides: "The Legislature hereby finds and declares that this
article is not intended, and shall not be construed, as authorizing the city or the county
to exercise its power to adopt, amend or repeal an open-space zoning ordinance in a
manner which will take or damage private property for public use without the payment
of just compensation therefor. This section is not intended to increase or decrease the
rights of any owner of property under the Constitution of the State of California or of
the United States." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65912 (West Supp. 1977).
150. Id. In the second portion of the opinion, the court cites California Government
Code section 51073 as additional support for the proposition that compensation is appro-
priate here. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 625, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 582. This section states that
"[t]he Legislature ...declares that the acquisition of open-space easements is in the
public interest and constitutes a public purpose for which public funds may be expended
or advanced." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51073 (West Supp. 1977). Similar to the issue in
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), this section answers only the question of wheth-
er or not public funds may be expended to this end; it does not decide whether acquisi-
tion is the only means to that end. In fact, the United States Supreme Court, in
Pennsylvania Coal, indicated that use of the power of eminent domain to effect a par-
ticular end does not preclude use of the police power to accomplish that same end. 260
U.S. at 418. See also Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 209, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 318, 320 (1963).
151. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65912 (West Supp. 1977).
152. 60 Cal. App. 3d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
153. The Eldridge decision has subsequently been cited in the federal decision
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similar. In Pinheiro plaintiffs did not challenge the validity of the
open-space zoning but rather stated their cause of action in inverse con-
demnation. 5 ' They did not allege their property had no remaining
reasonable beneficial use, 5 ' but they did allege that development of
it would be economically infeasible and that an interest in it had been
taken. 150 As in Eldridge the court did not find any precondemnation
activities or actual public use of the property. 157
The alleged decrease in property value from $960,000 to
$210,00015 8-a decrease at least as remarkable as that in Eldridge-
is treated in the manner suggested previously as appropriate with re-
spect to plaintiff Beyer; 59 i.e., the remaining fair market value itself
indicates that "there is a reasonably beneficial and substantial use
remaining under the new zoning ordinance."' 0  Thus the case is
brought within and decided under the holding in HFH.
More important, however, is Pinheiro's discussion in reaching its
decision. As the case was decided, it was not necessary to address the
critical question of the appropriate remedy-inverse condemnation or
action to invalidate-for an aggrieved landowner. In dictum, however,
the court does clearly indicate that it would reach an answer different
from that reached in Eldridge, and based on many of the same authori-
ties:
Except for Sneed v. County of Riverside, involving actual pub-
lic use of airspace over property restrictively zoned as to height
limitations, the other cases permitting relief in inverse condemna-
Sanfilippo v. County of Santa Cruz, 415 F. Supp. 1340 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The citation
to Eldridge appears in a footnote which reads in part as follows: 'This Court is in
accord with the California policy disfavoring findings of compensable inverse condemna-
tion in the application of otherwise valid land-use regulations. Plaintiffs will therefore
have a heavy burden of proving entitlement to monetary relief on the basis of excessive
restriction, bad faith or confiscatory intent ...... Id. at 1343 n.1 (emphasis added),
citing Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975);
Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972);
Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976). This
use of Eldridge indicates that the opinion may be used in a roundabout manner to
expand the scope of the narrow and presently well-defined exceptions to the rule
disfavoring compensation; traditionally a regulation that was "excessive" was struck
down. For a discussion of these exceptions, see text accompanying notes 179-98 infra.
154. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 326-27, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36.
155. Id. at 327, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 636. In this respect the pleadings of Pinheiro are
different from those in Eldridge.
156. Id. at 325, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
157. Id. at 328, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 636-37.
158. Id. at 325, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
159. Id. at 328, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 637. See text accompanying notes 90-96 supra.
160. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 325, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 634; cf. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Ct.,
15 Cal. 3d 508, 512 n.2, 542 P.2d 237, 240, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 368 (1975).
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tion fall into the category of 'inequitable precondemnation activity'
discussed in HFH Ltd.
Other decisions cited for the proposition that exercise of the
police power may be so harsh as to constitute a taking involved
holdings that the legislation was invalid or unconstitutional, rather
than compensation to the aggrieved landowner.161
All but three of the cases cited by Pinheiro for these two propositions
are also cited by Eldridge. Interestingly, the Pinheiro decision does
not cite Eldridge, although decided over two months after it. The su-
preme court has since denied a hearing in this case as well.162 These
inconsistent appellate decision highlight the confusing situation now
faced by landowners and local governments alike. The issue at the
center of this confusion is an important one that deserves the full con-
sideration of the state's highest court in the near future.
Understanding the Mistake:
The Historical Approach Gone Wrong
The Eldridge court has seriously misused California case law to
manufacture a remedy of money damages in an inverse condemnation
action in situations where restrictive zoning substantially reduces the
economic uses of land. As careful analysis of the cases cited in
Eldridge indicates, the appropriate remedy for excessively restrictive
zoning, absent physical damage or a clear intent to use zoning as a pre-
lude to physical taking, is invalidation of the zoning ordinance. Failure
of the Eldridge court to maintain this proper distinction among
remedies confuses the law and jeopardizes the ability of government
to engage in sound planning. The confusion surrounding this issue of
the appropriate remedy has been augmented in no small degree by the
manner in which some commentators have analyzed the Pennsylvania
Coal decision. Under one such approach Justice Holmes' decision in
Pennsylvania Coal is viewed as a historically critical turning point in
the Supreme Court's approach to problems under the "taking" clause
of the Constitution. 03 The change engendered by the decision is ex-
plained by contrasting it with the court's earlier decision in Mugler v.
Kansas.104
This approach typically interprets the famous Holmes language to
mean that the difference between regulation and taking is simply a dif-
ference of degree,1 5 not a difference in kind as it was under Justice
161. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 327 n.3, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36 (citations omitted).
162. Hearing was denied on August 26, 1976.
163. Mercer, Regulation (Police Power) v. Taking (Eminent Domain), 6 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 177, 182 (1974).
164. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See BOSSELMAN, supra note 6, at 134.
165. Id.
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Harlan's view in Mugler.0 6 The Mugler opinion is regarded as estab-
lishing "as a constitutional principle the doctrine that police power regu-
lations do not constitute compensable takings.. .-. 17 This went hand
in hand with a strict interpretation of the taking clause, 6 ' under which
a taking would be found only if property were physically taken and ap-
propriated for public use. Under this interpretation, it is inconceivable
that compensation would be required on the basis of the allegations in
Eldridge. Those who see Pennsylvania Coal as a turning point regard
this strict, bifurcated Mugler view as having been overruled by Pennsyl-
vania Coal in favor of its broader "continuum theory" of government
interference with private property.' 69 "This theory treats an exercise
of police power that exceeds the taking limit as an exercise of eminent
domain, therefore requiring the payment of just compensation." 170  It
suggests that a physical taking is no longer required. The advocates
of this interpretation, based on a literal construction of Justice Holmes'
famous words, open the door for the conclusion of the Eldridge court
with respect to inverse condemnation.
The merits of a literal interpretation of Pennsylvania Coal's taking
language have previously been discussed.17 1  A more careful analysis
also reveals that Pennsylvania Coal and Mugler, which are typically
contrasted, can in fact be harmonized. 172 Both Pennsylvania Coal and
Mugler involved challenges to laws which were thought to be overly
harsh by property owners affected by them. 7 ' Both were expressly
concerned with determining the limits beyond Which legislation cannot
rightfully go. And, in both cases the Court noted that an exercise of
the police power going beyond those limits was to be struck down,
174
166. Id. at 120.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See Inverse Condemnation, supra note 13, at 1445.
170. Id. The "theory is based on three-step reasoning. First, if regulation goes too
far, it will effectuate a taking. Second, eminent domain is the power by which
government takes or condemns property for public use. Third, when property is taken-
even by regulation-and compensation is not paid, inverse condemnation is an appropri-
ate means of remedying government oversight." Id. at 1446 (citations omitted).
171. See text accompanying notes 43-50 supra.
172. It is interesting to note that the majority opinion in Pennsylvania Coal does
not make reference to Mugler. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
173. The Mugler case involved a challenge by a brewery owner to Kansas statutes
prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors; it was argued that because
the breweries were erected lawfully prior to the prohibitions and would be virtually
worthless thereafter, compensation was owing. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). The Pennsylvania
Coal case involved a challenge to Pennsylvania's Kohler Act, which prohibited mining
under certain property with the object of preventing subsidence. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
174. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-14 (1922); Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
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rather than upheld on the condition that compensation be made for any
harsh effects. Thus, although Mugler did state that the power of
eminent domain (i.e., a taking) would be involved only in the event
of "actual physical invasion,"'17 5 the "taking" language of Pennsylvania
Coal, when viewed in context, does not overrule or even necessarily
contradict this idea. Pennsylvania Coal simply held invalid an overly
restrictive law. As the case was not one which involved an award of
damages in the absence of physical damage or invasion, it is a rather
strained interpretation which atrributes to its holding the power to over-
rule Mugler and to accord constitutional protection, in terms of award-
ing damages, to precisely such a broad new group of cases. Close scru-
tiny reveals that the Pennsylvania Coal case does no more than fall in
line with the Mugler language to the effect that "if . . a statute...
is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is
the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Con-
stitution.'
' 7
From the proper perspective, Holmes' famous words----"if regula-
tion goes too far it will be recognized as a taking"-are shown to be
little more than an exaggeration or a figure of speech aimed at defining
that same "outer limit" which was of concern to the court in Mugler;
the same result would attend in either case. Thus it is hoped that the
California Supreme Court will see, understand, and rectify the error
made by the Eldridge court concerning the appropriate remedy. In
this regard, the court would do well to follow the lead of New York's
highest court in its recent decision, Fred F. French Investment Co. v.
City of New York. 7   There the court juxtaposed takings and regula-
tions, with only the former necessitating compensation. The court
went on:
Of course, and this is often the beginning of confusion, a pur-
ported "regulation" may impose so onerous a burden on the prop-
erty regulated that it has, in effect, deprived the owner of the
reasonable income productive or other private use of his property
and thus has destroyed its economic value. In all but exceptional
cases, nevertheless, such a regulation does not constitute a "taking,"
and is therefore not compensable, but amounts to a deprivation or
frustration of property rights without due process of law and is
therefore invalid.
True, many cases have equated an invalid exercise of the
regulating zoning power, perhaps only metaphorically, with a "tak-
ing" or "confiscation" of property, terminology appropriate to the
175. 123 U.S. at 668. A close reading of this language in Mugler does seem to
indicate that the two types of exceptional cases spelled out by this note are not
inconsistent with that case. Id.
176. Id. at 661. For similar language in an opinion by Justice Holmes himself, see
Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
177. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
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eminent domain power and the concomitant right to compensation
when it is exercised.
The metaphor should not be confused with reality. Close ex-
amination of the cases reveals that in none of them, anymore than
in the Pennsylvania Coal case . . . , was there an actual "taking"
under the eminent domain power, despite the use of the terms
"taking" or "confiscatory." Instead, in each the gravamen of the
constitutional challenge to the regulatory measure was that it was
an invalid exercise of the police power under the due process
clause, and the cases were decided under that rubric.' 78
This insightful passage goes far to clarify the issue. It articulates well
the important distinction between the "taking" metaphor and the legal
realities overlooked by the court of appeal in Eldridge.
Defining the Exceptions
Along with the misunderstanding surrounding the "taking" lan-
guage, there is another factor which has contributed to the confusion
as to when inverse condemnation actions are appropriate. The cases
have carved out two important exceptions to the general rule that in-
verse condemnation does not lie to challenge an oppressive zoning or-
dinance. Some courts, however, have failed to recognize these excep-
tional situations for what they are and have proceeded from them to
conclude mistakenly that the general rule has been modified to entitle
an aggrieved landowner to damages. The court of appeal made such
a mistake in Eldridge.
History indicates that the draftsmen of the federal and state bills
of rights did not conceive of the possibility that a regulation of the use
of land might be considered a taking.'19  This historical analysis is sup-
ported by the fact that prior to the 20th century there was little need
for strict land use regulation. 18° Hence, there arose few occasions to
question the tenet that the protection of the "taking" clause was limited
to situations of actual physical invasion of property.' 8 ' As the regula-
tion of land became more complex, however, so did the constitutional
parameters within which regulations operated, 182 and it is in this con-
text that the California courts have evolved certain exceptions to the
earlier tenet.
178. Id. at 593-94, 350 N.E.2d at 384-85, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 8-9.
179. See BOSSELMAN, supra note 13, at 238-39.
180. See Costonis, supra note 48, at 1038; cf. Netherton, supra note 7, at 36.
181. See BOSSELMAN, supra note 13, at 115.
182. See Bosselman, Property Rights in Land: New Statutory Approaches, 15
NATURAL RES. J. 681 (1975); Badler, Municipal Zoning Liability in Damages-A New
Cause of Action, 5 URBAN LAw. 25, 53 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Badler].
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The California Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on
this subject is found in the HFH case.18 3  There, the court specifies
the two types of zoning-related situations in which an action in inverse
condemnation will lie. One of these involves "zoning classifications
invoked in order to evade the requirement that land used by the public
must be acquired in eminent domain proceedings"; 8 4 Sneed is cited
as such a case. 8 ' The other involves "inequitable zoning actions
undertaken by a public agency as a prelude to public acquisition";
8 6
Kopping and Peacock are cited as examples.'8 7 The unique features
of these cases-actual public use and inequitable actions-were enu-
merated earlier and contrasted with the Eldridge situation";' ss this
analysis by the supreme court confirms that such cases are to be con-
sidered apart from, rather than a part of, the general rule. In the
French case, New York's highest court gave similar recognition to these
exceptions as follows:
'The sole exception to this mild outcome [of declaratory re-
lief] occurs where the challenged measure is either intended to
eventuate in actual public ownership of the land or has already
caused government to encroach on the land with trespassory con-
sequences that are largely irreversible." 8 9
The first of these exceptions concerning actual public use of
property appears to be a logical extension of the earlier rule limiting
the "taking" clause to situations of actual physical invasion. In such
cases-e.g., where the governmental authority has already erected a
nearby airport or flood control project and operated overflights'00 or
planned increased floodwater inundation' 9 1-the irreversible effects of
such actions preclude the effectiveness of injunctive or declaratory re-
lief and warrant compensatory relief; invalidation of the zoning alone
could not restore the landowner to his previous position. Pinheiro v.
County of Marin 12 points out, however, that the applicability of this
183. 15 Cal. 3d at 517 n.14, 542 P.2d at 243, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
184. Id.
185. For an indication of further agreement with this type of analysis, see note 161
supra.
186. 15 Cal. 3d at 517 n.14, 542 P.2d at 243, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
187. Id. For an article that views Peacock as part of a general trend of decisions
that increasingly recognizes liability for damages, a trend that changes the general rule,
see Badler, supra note 182.
188. See text accompanying notes 68-76 supra.
189. 39 N.Y.2d at 594, 350 N.E.2d at 385, quoting Costonis, supra note 48, at
1035.
190. See Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318
(1963).
191. See, e.g., House v. Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 153 P.2d 950 (1944);
cf. Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972).
192. 60 Cal. App. 3d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
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exception is limited to cases where such public use is a present reality
and does not extend to speculation about future governmental inten-
tions.' °  The fact that the court in Brown v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency' subsequently limited itself to declaratory and injunctive
remedies brings that case into line with others in this regard. Hence,
in the absence of additional allegations that their lands have actually
been used by the public, plaintiffs Beyer and Eldridge have not stated
a case that falls within this exception. Through its mistaken construc-
tion and application of the general rule to these pleadings, however,
the Eldridge court has circumvented the necessity of dealing with any
such exceptions.
The exception involving inequitable precondemnation activity is
also of narrow scope. The particular governmental activities which
made the Klopping and Peacock cases outstanding have been dis-
cussed. In referring back to the Klopping case, the HFH court said
of it, "We held only that the plaintiff should be able to include in his
eminent domain damages the decline in value attributable to . . .un-
reasonable precondemnation action by the city."' 95  The reasonable-
ness of awarding damages is manifest in such a situation where the gov-
ernmental agency has already gone to the extent of initiating condem-
nation proceedings. The Peacock decision is distinguishable in that
damages there were awarded although the county ultimately renounced
its intent to acquire the plaintiff's land. Thus Peacock is singular in its
award of damages in the absence of either actual invasion or use of
property or an ongoing governmental intent to acquire it. The
supreme court, however, has subsequently stressed the extraordinary
and prolonged nature of the inequitable actions in that case and has
indicated that it is correctly viewed only as an exception to the general
rule. 196 The general rule thus remains that enactment of an oppressive
zoning ordinance does not entitle an aggrieved landowner to compensa-
tion. '9 With these exceptional situations more clearly understood and
properly placed in an analytical framework, it can be seen that the cases
of plaintiffs Eldridge and Beyer are governed by the general rule and
so do not qualify for compensation under either of the exceptions. 19 8
193. Id. at 328, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
194. 385 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Nev. 1973).
195. 15 Cal. 3d at 517 n.14, 542 P.2d at 243, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
196. Id. Among those circumstances stressed were the direct assurances to the
landowner that his property would eventually be acquired.
197. For another airport case in which restrictive zoning was invalidated, see
Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958).
198. For a brief review of other possible remedies courts might fashion, see




Having presented the state of existing law, one final point remains
to be discussed with regard to the issue of the appropriate remedy in
restrictive zoning cases. The position taken in this note is that the
Eldridge decision does not represent an informed shift away from exist-
ing law but merely a misconstruction of it. If the supreme court does
view the case as such a shift, 9 ' it should proceed cautiously before ap-
proving it. Many important policy considerations would attend a deci-
sion by that court to require awards of compensation to landowners
aggrieved by no more than the enactment of a restrictive zoning
ordinance.
The most noteworthy policy considerations relate to financial and
planning matters. Making available the inverse condemnation remedy
to such landowners would have a profound "chilling effect" upon the
exercise of the police power at the local level.200 Planning and zoning
measures enacted under that power would be enacted at the risk of
incurring severe and unexpected financial liability. If Eldridge re-
mains the law, a municipality will be compelled to enforce its ordinance
at its own peril until a judicial determination of the effect of the
ordinance is made. 20 1  This threat of unanticipated financial liability
will intimidate legislative bodies and will discourage the implementa-
tion of strict or innovative planning measures in favor of measures
which are less stringent, more traditional, and fiscally safe.20 2 This re-
sult does not seem to comport with the California Supreme Court's clear
recognition of the necessity for planning to curb "the deleterious conse-
quences of haphazard community growth. 20 3  In addition, this ap-
proach puts the courts, rather than legislative bodies, in the position
of controlling public funds. 20 4  The traditional legislative functions of
evaluating programs and allocating resources to them will be usurped
199. For a view that the Eldridge analysis is consistent with the direction in which
the law is generally heading, see Badler, supra note 182. See also Beuscher, Some
Tentative Notes on the Integration of Police Power and Eminent Domain by the
Courts: So-Called Inverse or Reverse Condemnation, 1 URB. L. ANN. 1, 9 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Beuscher].
200. See Beuscher, supra note 199, at 12; Inverse Condemnation, supra note 13, at
1450.
201. Cf. Cabaniss, Inverse Condemnation in Texas-Exploring The Serbonian Bog,
44 TEX. L. REv. 1584, 1600 (1966).
202. See Beuscher, supra note 199, at 1-2.
203. Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 120, 514 P.2d
111, 117, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 805 (1973). There were some early zoning laws which
gave assurances of compensation to those damaged by the zoning restrictions. This
system of mixing zoning and payments became hopelessly confused and has long since
been abandoned. See Beuscher, supra note 199, at 2-3.
204. See Inverse Condemnation, supra note 13, at 1450.
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by a judiciary ill-equipped to carry out legislative weighing processes. 20 5
Instilling the judiciary with such power is not required to protect prop-
erty owners. Injunctive relief alone should protect property owners
while giving local governments an opportunity to reassess an enjoined
plan to determine if the merits warrant an independent exercise of
eminent domain.
Many commentators, moreover, argue that a public policy permit-
ting the purchase of compliance with what would traditionally be un-
authorized regulations is misconceived.2 06  The possibility of compen-
sation inherent in such a policy appears to invite nonparticipation in the
legislative process rather than encourage property owners to follow that
process closely to guard against arbitrary exercises of the police
power. 
20 7
An additional question is raised by the broad powers of initiative
held by California voters .20  Legilsation in the nature of zoning can
be and has been enacted by the people through a direct initiative. Are
the voters, through the initiative power, also to have this unwelcome
power to inadvertently commit funds from the public treasury? 2 9 The
logical extension of requiring compensation for the mere enactment of
a harsh zoning measure indicates that the answer would be in the affirm-
ative. The potential for fiscal chaos would be great if this were the
result.
A number of practical, administrative problems also arise as a re-
sult of any shift toward broader application of the inverse condemnation
remedy. In many instances where the taking is of less than a fee in-
terest it will be difficult to determine exactly what property interest
has been taken and what the proper amount of compensation is.2 10
The conveyance of these ill-defined interests211 may encumber the
205. Id. at 1450-51. See also Brief for Attorney General as Amicus Curiae at 12,
57 Cal. App. 3d 615, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
206. See Costonis, supra note 48, at 1071; Beuscher, supra note 199, at 14; Recent
Cases, 66 H&Rv. L. REV. 1124, 1135 (1953).
207. Recent Cases, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1124, 1135 (1953).
208. See, e.g., CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 27000-27650 (West Supp. 1976) (California
Coastal Zone Conservation Commission). This act was approved by the voters at the
general election held November 7, 1972.
209. See Letter from Evelle J. Younger, California Attorney General, to A. Alan
Post, California Legislative Analyst, Dec. 29, 1975, regarding the effects of recent case
law on the costs of implementing the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act. The
analysis of the Attorney General, particularly with regard to the implications of HFH, is
similar to the position taken in this note.
210. See Inverse Condemnation, supra note 13, at 1451; Fair Compensation, supra
note 48, at 1071; Beuscher, supra note 199, at 12.
211. For examples of what such interests might be, see Beuscher, supra note 199, at
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marketability of titles while such interests are in government ownership
and create other conveyancing problems.212  If the enactment of a
harsh zoning ordinance alone becomes a sufficient basis for an inverse
condemnation action, it will be critical to determine at what point the
government can still free itself of liability by repealing or amending
such an ordinance.-' And one must ask what is to become of the ap-
parently unusable interest the government was compelled to purchase
when circumstances change and a measure is revised so as to no longer
constitute a taking.214 In light of these problems, a shift away from
the clear precedent restricting the applicability of inverse condemnation
does not appear well advised.
Determining the Validity of an Ordinance
Under the Eldridge court's analysis the determination of validity
is postponed until the third and final portion of the opinion.21 5 By rul-
ing as it did in the first two segments, the court painted itself into a
logical corner. Having considered the factors of reasonableness and
oppressiveness in its determination of entitlement to damages in inverse
condemnation, the court prematurely exhausted the material which
usually forms the core of a determination of validity. Left with little
else, the court was forced to conclude that the validity question hinges
solely on the permissibility of the objectives with which the legislative
body enacted the ordinance.21 6 Examination of those cases cited in
both the second and third parts of Eldridge, however, leaves the court
with meager support for this conclusion. In fact these cases indicate
that the inquiry into the validity of a zoning ordinance encompasses all
of these factors-reasonableness, oppressiveness, and purpose. More-
over, these cases support the proposition that the determination of the
outer limits of the police power should proceed on a case by case basis;
use of traditional police power analyses precludes the necessity or wis-
dom of establishing an unyielding outer limit beyond which all measures
will invariably be found invalid. Thus, a closer look at the cited cases,
as well as others, is instructive not only for the purpose of illuminating
the weaknesses in the Eldridge analysis but also for providing guidance
for the manner in which validity should properly be determined.
The Pennsylvania Coal decision is again cited in the second part
of the opinion as the "ruling authority, ' '21 7 this time with regard to the
212. Id. at 12-13.
213. Id. at 4, 12.
214. Id. at 12-13.
215. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 629-31, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 584-86.
216. Id. at 629, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
217. Id. at 626, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
LAND USE LAWJuly 1977]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
compensation issue. The familiar language of that case, however, does
no more to illuminate the precise point at which compensation will be
required than it did initially to reveal inverse condemnation as the ap-
propriate remedy. Pennsylvania Coal merely states that there in fact
is a point at which the police power ends.
Having shown that Pennsylvania Coal was misconstrued in
Eldridge, however, the case should not be dismissed without first glean-
ing from it the guidance offered on how to evaluate validity. The
Supreme Court emphasized the presumption of legislative validity,
while pointing out that validity "depends on the particular facts '218 in
each case. The extent of diminution in property values was labeled
as but one factor for consideration in determining the limits of the
police power.219 With regard to this factor the Court said, "when it
reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be
an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.
'220
The Court's seeming equivocation here is perhaps an indication that
it could foresee a situation which would warrant upholding restrictions
severely diminishing property values. These statements provide strong
support for a flexible police power, the limits of which should be estab-
lished on a case-by-case basis; they weigh against establishing an un-
yielding rule to cut across all situations.
Diminution in value was not the only factor considered in Pennsyl-
vania Coal. The Court also looked at the nature of the public interest
involved in relation to the kind of interference with private property,
at the type of damage to be inflicted in the absence of a statute, and
at possible less drastic alternatives. 221  It was explicitly assumed that
the objective of the statute was permissible; 222 this assumption did not
operate to uphold the validity of the challenged law, as the Eldridge
court suggests it should. Rather, the diminution and purpose factors
were only two of several considered in the Court's assessment; their
combined effect caused the Court to strike down the statute. Thus,
Pennsylvania Coal placed consideration of oppressiveness on the proper
side of the equation, integrating it into the determination of whether
the ordinance was valid at all, rather than using it to determine
whether, despite the validity of the ordinance, the resulting diminution
in value should be compensated.
218. 260 U.S. at 413. See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
219. Id.
220. Id. Note that this language does not say that the court will assume the
authority to exercise eminent domain.
221. Id. at 413-14.
222. Id. at 416.
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The Supreme Court decision in Nectow v. City of Cambridge
22 3
uses a similar approach. There the Court also stresses that a restriction
must "bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare ' 224 as a prerequisite of validity. 25  This discussion
of the Pennsylvania Coal and Nectow cases further highlights the precipi-
tousness of Eldridge's validity ruling. Despite its holding, the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals acknowledges that the very considerations of the
United States Supreme Court viewed as determinative of validity re-
main uninvestigated; it states that questions as to the "extent, and im-
pact, of the intrusion upon plaintiffs' property" and the existence of a
"reasonable basis for the ordinances' declared aims" are unanswered. 226
Hinging validity on a perfunctory review of purpose alone does not
comport with the in-depth assessment called for by the Supreme Court.
For direct support on the validity issue the Eldridge court also cites
Berman v. Parker,221 Sierra Club v. Morton,228 Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,229 and Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Super-
visors.230  Taken together these cases describe a police power that is
adaptable and expanding,231 pursuing a concept of the public welfare
that is broad and inclusive. Certainly Palo Alto's expressed goals of
preserving and protecting natural resources and open space lands2 32 fall
within the ambit of such a power. These general tenets, even as to
the importance of environmental quality, should be accepted only at
face value, however, and should not be construed to represent the still
broader proposition that a stamp of validity will be placed on. all
measures enacted in pursuit of such policies. The facts of each of the
cited cases are readily distinguishable from Eldridge233 and in no way
223. 277 U.S. 183 (1928). This decision is cited by the Eldridge court. 57 Cal.
App. 3d at 626, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
224. 277 U.S. at 188.
225. On the basis of detailed findings of fact the Court concluded this relationship
was missing and struck down the ordinance. Id. at 188-89.
226. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 628, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
227. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
228. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
229. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
230. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
231. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). The Berman case views the police power as the broad
power under which statutes in the public interest are enacted; eminent domain is viewed
as merely one means to an end under this power. Thus this case was concerned with
answering the narrow question of whether the condemnation suit there was in pursuit of
a public purpose and not with evaluating the validity of what is traditionally called an
exercise of the police power, such as zoning.
232. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 622-24, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 580-81.
233. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (considered standing to sue of
environmental group); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (condemnation suit
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support the interpretive leap made there by the court. Curiously, the
appellate court's brief excerpt from Euclid itself mentions twice that
arbitrariness, unreasonableness and oppressiveness figure into the de-
termination of validity, thus refuting its own interpretation.
Analysis of precedent should not stop, however, once the proposi-
tion that zoning ordinance validity rests on purpose alone has been re-
futed in favor of incorporating a host of factors into that determination.
Terminating the discussion at this point-with the cases taken out
of the compensation context and placed into the validity contest-might
leave the impression that the proper analysis of these cases results in
advocating setting an absolute outer boundary for the purpose of deter-
mining invalidity as opposed to compensation. On the contrary, case
law makes it clear that validity of an ordinance should be determined
on a case-by-case basis rather than by reference to a fixed rule.
The importance of the case-by-case approach was a recurrent
theme in the cases discussed by the Eldridge court. In Dooley v. Town
Planning & Zoning Commission,234 the Connecticut court did use lan-
guage indicating that zoning which deprives landowners of all worth-
while rights or benefits in their land is per se invalid.2 35  However, in
reaching its conclusion to strike down the zoning as to the plaintiff, the
court actually employed a more traditional police power analysis rather
than relying on an absolute and one-dimensional test. That is, the
court considered whether there was a rational relation between the
regulation and subjects properly within the police power, and it ex-
amined the means used. The extent of diminution in property values
was considered merely one factor relevant to the determination of
validity. 236  The court pointed out the fact that the plaintiff's land was
on high ground which had not been inundated during previous
floods. 237  Thus it appears there was an absence of the necessary
rational relationship between the restrictions and its purpose, in as
much as the zoning measures aimed at flood control appeared unneces-
sary as to this plaintiff. 238  Given these other criteria used by the
Dooley court in determining validity (and not entitlement to compen-
brought for purpose of acquiring property for redevelopment project); Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upheld validity of zoning); Friends of
Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761
(1972) (defined jurisdiction of California Environmental Quality Act).
234. 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964).
235. Id. at 312, 197 A.2d at 774.
236. Id. at 310, 197 A.2d at 773.
237. ld. at 311, 197 A.2d at 773.
238. With regard to the appropriate remedy issue, it is noteworthy that in Dooley,
despite the fact that the court found the ordinance confiscatory, the remedy was to hold
it inapplicable rather than to award compensation. Id. at 314, 197 A.2d at 775.
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sation), it is apparent that the language setting the absolute outer limit
could be ignored and the same result would ensue.
Employing a similar analysis, the court of appeal correctly reached
the opposite result in Turner v. County of Del Norte,2"9 another case
involving harsh flood plain zoning. There, having examined the
"reasonableness of the ordinance in relation to the promotion of health,
safety or general welfare . . .24 the court held the zoning valid be-
cause "[t]he zoning ordinance in question imposes no restrictions more
stringent than the existing danger demands." '' The Dooley and
Turner cases are reconcilable despite the fact that they reach opposite
conclusions while considering similar laws. Each court based its con-
clusion on an examination of the total factual picture, and on this basis
the cases are distinguished and their divergent results explained. A
test absolutely mandating invalidity on the basis of uses denied would
cause both of these ordinances to be struck down. In contrast, the tra-
ditional police power, case-by-case approach was one which served both
occasions well.
This same point can be made by comparing two other cases, both
cited by the Eldridge court and both concerned with wetlands fill. In
State v. Johnson242 the Maine Supreme Court, echoing Pennsylvania
Coal, stated, "Conditions so burdensome may be imposed that they are
equivalent to an outright taking .. 243 In a similar fashion a Cali-
fornia appellate court stated, "an undue restriction on the use of private
property is as much a taking for constitutional purposes as appropriating
or destroying it."'244 First, both of these statements are merely conclu-
sory and do not give any indication how the respective courts analyzed
the challenged measures to determine if they were unduly restrictive
or burdensome. Second, it has been shown that the term "taking" does
nothing in and of itself to provide guidance for the validity determina-
tion and, in fact, introducing it appears to cause some courts substantial
confusion. Hence, the more productive inquiry is a close look at what
circumstances caused one court to strike down 245 and another court to
uphold240 similar measures restricting wetlands fill.2 47  To be sure,
239. 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972).
240. Id. at 314, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
241. Id. at 315, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
242. 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
243. Id. at 715.
244. Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 572, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897, 906 (1970).
245. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 716 (Me. 1970).
246. Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 572, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897, 906 (1970).
247. One area of distinction is that the legislation in Johnson was statewide in scope,
whereas in Candlestick it was localized. Also worthy of comparison are the remaining
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diminution in value figures prominently in each court's analysis, but
again it is only one factor in a multifaceted analysis.
Again, using an approach which sets an absolute outer limit to the
police power, many of the cases cited in Eldridge appear difficult to
reconcile, whereas under the traditional police power case-by-case ap-
proach this is not so. For example, in MacGibbon v. Board of
Appeals 248 the court sets up what might be viewed as an outer limit
when it states flatly that preserving wetlands in their natural state is
not within the scope of the police power."' In Just v. Marinette
County,250 however, the court held it was a reasonable exercise of that
power to prevent public harm by restricting privately owned wetlands
to their natural uses. 251  Rather than simply dismiss these cases as
hopelessly in conflict, the more helpful exercise is to look closely at
the factors considered by each court in reaching its conclusion; e.g., the
types of uses permitted under the ordinances, the severity of the threat
to natural resources, the location of the property, and so forth. In this
context, differences come to light which help to reconcile the outcomes
of such cases which, at first glance, appear contradictory. It is not sug-
gested that this approach will result in overcoming all cross-jurisdic-
tional differences in the latitude allowed under the police power. The
important point is that the heart of these cases and their value for courts
in the future cannot be expressed in any easy formulaic statements.
A final example of the case-by-case approach comes from the
California Supreme Court in the case of Consolidated Rock Products
Co. v. City of Los Angeles.252  The court there upheld the validity of
an ordinance prohibiting the extraction of gravel while acknowledging
that the zoning had diminished almost completely the economic value
of the land; the subject property had only minimal value for any of the
permitted uses. 253 Taking into consideration the public benefits to be
uses permitted under the legislation and the remaining value of the property. The Volpe
case cited in Eldridge, also deals with no-fill restrictions; that case acknowledged that the
purpose behind the ordinance was a public purpose. This decision as to the purpose was,
however, specifically stated by the court not to be the whole matter as to validity. The
case was remanded so that further findings of fact could be made. A determination of
validity could not be made while these factual questions remained unanswered. The
Eldridge court did not hesitate to pass on validity despite the fact that similar unan-
swered questions remained before it. Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe &
Co., 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965).
248. 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970).
249. Id. at 640-41, 255 N.E.2d at 351.
250. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
251. Id. at 17, 201 N.W.2d at 768.
252. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962). See also Potomac
Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of Md., 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241 (1972).
253. 57 Cal. 2d at 530, 370 P.2d at 351, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
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gained, the elastic nature of the public welfare,254 and legislative testi-
mony that certain uses did remain, 55 the ordinance appeared reason-
able. Similar ordinances have been struck down by other courts where
the circumstances were less compelling.2 56 Most often cases will come
out the same regardless of whether the case-by-case or absolute
analysis is used, for it will only be an exceptional set of circumstances
under the former, more traditional approach that will justify upholding
an ordinance going beyond the "reasonable or beneficial use" limit set
by the Eldridge court. Nevertheless, Consolidated Rock suggests
257
that such a set of circumstances may arise, and therefore highlights the
importance of retaining flexibility in this area. 58
Thus, the classic police power analysis appears to be the better
rule for all occasions; both the United States and California Supreme
Courts have so indicated. In Hadacheck v. Sebastian,25 9 the United
States Supreme Court deemed the police power the least limitable of
government's essential powers260 and upheld an ordinance that effec-
tively reduced property to 1/13 of its former value. More recently, in
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, the Court reiterated that "although
a comparison of values before and after [a governmental action] is rele-
vant . . . it is by no means conclusive .... ,"261 Referring to the police
power the Court stated:
The term. . . connotes the time-tested conceptional limit of public
encroachment upon private interests. Except for the substitution
of the familiar standard of "reasonableness," this Court has gener-
ally refrained from announcing any specific criteria.
2 62
The case holds that this standard of reasonableness demands that the
action be required by the general public interest, and that the means
254. Id. at 532, 370 P.2d at 353, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
255. Id. at 530, 370 P.2d at 351, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 647. Notably these uses were
similar to those permitted under the Palo Alto zoning. The court also referred to a
strong presumption of legislative validity.
256. See, e.g., Lyon Sand & Gravel Co. v. Township of Oakland, 33 Mich. App.
614, 190 N.W.2d 354 (1971).
257. See also McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932
(1953); CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 3d
306, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1974).
258. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962). Several cases
indicate that there is no set formula for determining the outer limits of the police power.
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); United States v. Central
Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922); Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 484 (1925); Commis-
sioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965).
259. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
260. Id. at 410.
261. 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
262. Id. (emphasis added).
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be reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose and not unduly op-
pressive on individuals.2 63  This is a classic restatement of the tradi-
tional police power approach advocated above.2 64
Conclusion
Commentators and courts alike have urged that the complexity
and importance of the inverse condemnation issue call for legislative
solutions.26 5 To date, however, legislatures have been reluctant to take
up this call, leaving the courts as the sole arbitrator in this dispute.
Hence, careful and consistent decisionmaking by the bench takes on
critical importance. The points in this presentation can be brought to-
gether to form a unified framework within which such decisions may
be made; the New York Court of Appeal's French26 case provides
a good example. The first step is to determine whether the circum-
stances cause the case to fall within one of the exceptions involving in-
equitable precondemnation activities or actual public use. If the case
does fall within either narrow exception, an inverse condemnation
action is appropriate. If it does not, there has been no taking within
the meaning of constitutional limitations, and a landowner plaintiff will
be limited to seeking declaratory relief. i.e., a declaration of the
ordinance's invalidity. In evaluating validity, courts must look at the
facts of each case. They must determine whether the ordinance bears
a substantial relation to a legitimate governmental purpose and whether
there is a reasonable relationship between that purpose and the means
used to fulfill it. This must be done without being unduly oppressive.
Courts must, however, keep in view the strong presumption of validity
applicable to any such legislative measure. The time has come for
California's highest court to set the record straight on these important
questions.
Barbara J. Hall*
263. Id. For similar language from California's highest court, see Hamer v. Town of
Ross, 59 Cal, 2d 776, 782, 382 P.2d 375, 379, 31 Cal. Rptr. 335, 339 (1963).
264. See also 195 Cal. 477, 484 (1925); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Ct., 15 Cal. 3d 508,
522, 542 P.2d 237, 247, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 375 (1975).
265. 15 Cal. 3d at 521, 542 P.2d at 247, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 375; Van Alstyne,
Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria,
44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1970).
266. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976). For a discussion of
this case, see text accompanying notes 177-78 supra.
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